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Recent work in linguistics and philosophy of language has focused on a great number of slurs 
targeting race, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, disability or political views. 
Despite this variety, however, most studies focus on English slurs, whereas investigations of 
slurs in other languages are rather sparse. At the same time, current discussions are concerned 
with a few well-established uses: e.g., derogative and appropriated. While it is no doubt crucial 
for a theory of slurs to account for such uses, there are other uses of slurs that have not been paid 
attention to. 
My aim in this paper is twofold. First, I want to bring to light some data regarding the use 
of the Romanian slur “țigan” (roughly translated in English as “gypsy”). Consideration of this 
data leads me to postulate a sui-generis, irreducible type of use of slurs, which I dub 
“identificatory” and which is potentially problematic for many extant theories of slurs. Second, I 
want to put forward a theory that accounts both for such uses and those mentioned above, 
without either postulating ambiguity or resorting to the idea that a slur’s meaning solely depends 
on the intentions, beliefs or attitudes of speakers. I hold, instead, that slurs are polysemous. I 
appeal to a certain type of theory from lexical semantics to account for polysemy (a “rich-
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lexicon” theory) and show how it can be applied to the various uses of “țigan” and to slurs in 
general. 
I proceed as follows. In the first section, I very briefly present several characteristics of 
slurs and their main uses. Section 2 is dedicated to presenting the data and its interpretation. In 
section 3 I show how identificatory uses can be problematic for extant theories of slurs. The next 
two sections present the sketch of a rich-lexicon approach to polysemy, first as it applies to 
nouns in general, then in application to slurs. In section 6 I discuss several important issues that 
arise. I then summarize and conclude.  
 
1 Slurs: what they are and how we use them 
A common way to characterize slurs has been by way of the function they serve in discourse. 
The following quote from Robin Jeshion nicely summarizes what most authors agree the main 
purpose of using slurs is, namely “to derogate or dehumanize (…), to signal that their targets are 
unworthy of equal standing or full respect as persons, that they are inferior as persons.” (Jeshion 
2013, 232). It is also widely agreed that slurs do double duty: they manage to refer to or pick out 
a particular group (what I call in what follows “the target group”), and derogate its members 
because of being members of that group. Slurs thus target both groups and individuals, the latter 
via group membership. The main task of a theory of slurs is to offer a mechanism by which to 
capture the derogatory aspect of slurs.1 
A lot of work has been put into discerning the characteristic traits of slurs. Among those 
that most researchers have agreed upon are nondisplaceability (Potts 2007): the derogatory 
character of slurs doesn’t disappear when embedded under various linguistic constructions, such 
as speech or beliefs reports, conditionals or negation; derogatory variation (Hom 2008, 2010; 
Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2018): the fact that slurs vary in their derogatoriness, both when they 
target the same target group and across target groups; independence (what Hom 2008 calls 
“derogatory autonomy”; Anderson and Lepore 2013a): the fact that their derogatory character 
 
1 Some authors (e.g., Davis and McCready 2020) distinguish between the derogatory character of slurs, which is 
encoded in language, and their offensiveness, which has to do with the intentions of those using the slur. Others 
(e.g., Rappaport 2019) distinguish between the offensiveness and the toxicity of slurs, where the latter is responsible 
for the fact that the mere mentioning of a slur (e.g., the n-word) can produce strong affective effects in the audience.  
While I think these distinctions are important and illuminate various aspects of the debate, in what follows I will 
adopt a more flat-footed view that doesn’t make such fine distinctions. According to this view (which I don’t 
necessarily endorse), derogation leads to offense, whose intensity in turn explains toxicity. As far as I can tell, 
collapsing these distinctions doesn’t affect the main points made in this paper. 
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doesn’t depend on the intentions, beliefs or attitudes of speakers. While accounting for these 
traits is a desideratum for any theory of slurs, I will be concerned in this paper only with the 
latter. For my purposes here, independence will be taken to be non-negotiable.  
In addition to the characteristics just highlighted, slurs have been taken to have several 
types of uses. As we have seen, slurs’ main use is the one by which they fulfill their function to 
derogate, namely their derogatory use. But they have other uses, too, including non-derogatory 
ones.2 The most discussed such uses are appropriated3 uses, mostly directed towards members of 
a target group to which the speaker belongs, but not with the purpose of derogating. One widely 
used example of a successfully appropriated slur is “queer”, which nowadays has become devoid 
of derogatory content (many academic publications have “Queer Studies” in their title, for 
example), or the n-word, which has been reserved for in-group use (Gloria Naylor’s essay “The 
Meanings of a Word” shows the great variety of forms its appropriated use can take). Essentially, 
what happens when slurs are used in such a way is that they cease to communicate a negative 
attitude towards the target group, and communicate a positive one instead. There are also what 
Hom (2008) has called nonderogatory, nonappropriated  (NDNA) uses, whose purpose is to 
correct certain injustices stemming from the derogatory uses of a slur, as in “Institutions that 
treat Chinese as chinks are morally depraved.” (2008, 424). Anderson 2018, following previous 
work, points to what he calls referential uses; thus, he notes in connection to the n-word (more 
precisely, one of its derived forms) that it is often used by African Americans as a synonym for 
“friend; buddy; man” (2018, 9). The distinguishing mark of referential uses is that the speaker 
need not intend to communicate a positive attitude with the slur; a neutral attitude is the default. 
Metaphorical uses of slurs (or at least some of them), as in John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s song 
“Woman is the nigger of the world”, attempt not to derogate, but to prove a point.4 Finally, there 
are didactical or quotational uses such as those found in academic works or courts of law for 
purposes of illustration, where slurs are not used, but merely mentioned. Here, I won’t pay 
 
2 There is currently a growing interest in such uses in the literature: see, for example, the special issue “Non-
derogatory Uses of Slurs” recently published in Grazer Philosophische Studien (Cepollaro and Zeman 2020). 
3 Several terms have been coined in the literature for this type of use; besides “appropriated”, various authors have 
used “reclaimed” or “re-appropriated” as well. The main reason against using “appropriated” and “appropriation” is 
that it has the connotation that something has been unlawfully taken (as in “cultural appropriation”), whereas the 
phenomenon at hand is different. However, no consensus has been arrived at in this matter, so I will use 
“appropriated” in what follows. 
4 That is not to say that such attempts are always successful. In the case above, the title and the lyrics of the song 
have sparked controversy, leading to the refusal of many radio hosts to play it on their stations. 
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attention to all these uses, but focus on appropriated and referential ones instead – mainly with 
the purpose of characterizing the novel type of use I postulate. I grant, of course, that a complete 
theory of slurs must account for all types of uses of slurs, although that is not my project here. 
The existence of such a variety of uses points toward a certain variability of slurs: the 
same word, or even the same sentence, can be used derogatorily in one context and non-
derogatorily in another. Even leaving aside metaphorical and didactical uses, this sensitivity to 
context is a remarkable feature of slurs, and any complete theory should account for it. What the 
elements in a specific context that allow for a felicitous use of a slur in a non-derogatory way are 
is a crucial question, as is the issue of whether the variation mentioned is semantic, pragmatic, or 
of yet another kind. My answer to some of these questions lies in construing slurs as polysemous. 
In sketching the rich-lexicon theory I think gives the best account of polysemy, I focus mostly on 
accounting for the main uses of slurs highlighted above – including the one about to be 
presented. Although this not the end of the story (a compete theory of slurs having to account 
both for their various uses and for their characteristics), it is an important part of any theoretical 
endeavor. One advantage that I take such a view to have is that avoids ambiguity. However, it 
should be kept in mind that I see the view’s main attraction not in accomplishing this feature, but 
rather in putting polysemy theories into sharper focus and thus contributing further to a fruitful 
line of research. Let’s now have a look at the data. 
 
2 Identificatory uses of slurs: the data 
In 2007, Romanian president Trăian Băsescu has been recorded calling a journalist “stinky 
gypsy” (“țigancă împuțită”) and was subsequently fined by the National Council against 
Discrimination.5 The slur “țigan/țigancă”, roughly translated into English with “gypsy”, comes 
from the Byzantine Greek word “athinganos”, which supposedly meant “untouchable” or “dirty”, 
thus encapsulating a negative connotation from the very beginning. The journalist targeted by the 
president was not a Roma ethnic, yet “țigan” and its cognates are currently and commonly used 
 
5 The president apologized after the story broke to the public, but was fined nevertheless. For part of the story, see 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/18789903/ns/world_news-europe/t/romania-president-sorry-stinky-gypsy-
slur/#.Xbg3NehKjb0.  
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as a slur targeting Roma ethnics. The derogatory use of “țigan” is widespread and permeates 
most aspects of their lives.6 
However, while its derogatory use is very hard to contest, a number of members of the 
Roma community use “țigan” to identify as belonging to the ethnic group. I base this claim on a 
Romanian Governmental Report 2009 (henceforth RGR) aimed at gathering information about 
the social and economic situation of the Roma community (officially, as large as 650.000 people) 
in Romania. Among many other questions, Roma ethnics have been asked the following, with 
the percentage of answers displayed below: 
 
“How do you usually refer to yourself and other Roma ethnics?”  
- “țigan”: 66%; 
- “rrom” (the word for “gypsy” in the Roma ethnics’ language, Romani, a 
different language from Romanian): 30%; 
- no answer: 4%. 
 
“How do you refer to yourself and other Roma ethnics in the Romani language?”  
- “țigan”: 44%;  
- “rrom”: 32%;  
- no Romani speaker: 22%;  
- no answer: 2%.7  
 
 
6 In this, “țigan” differs from the way in which Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016 take “gypsy” to function: not as a 
slur, but as a word that could be used to derogate in certain contexts. Castroviejo, Fraser and Vicente 2020 take the 
Spanish “gitano” to be an ESTI (“ethnic/social terms used as insults”), a type of expression that, according to them, 
can be used to derogate but differs from slurs. I should make it clear that the claims in this paper concern only 
“țigan” and its uses, and might not straightforwardly apply to uses of similar terms in other languages. Whether such 
terms function as slurs and what other uses they have depends on complex historical, social and political issues. 
7 The exact questions were “What do you usually say?” (“Dumneavoastră cum spuneţi de obicei?”, RGR: 46, 
question RD13) and “What do you usually say when you speak Romani?” (“Când vorbiţi în limba romani 
dumneavoastră cum spuneţi de obicei?”, RGR: 46, question RD13a) – which, in themselves, are quite vague. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from the contexts of the questionnaire that those whom the answer should apply were the 
participants themselves and other Roma ethnics from their community. The answers to another question are also 
relevant – namely, “Among the following expressions which best describes your identity? Do you first and foremost 
consider yourself…?” (“Din expresiile următoare, care sunt acelea care descriu cel mai bine identitatea dvs.? Vă 
consideraţi în primul rând...?”, RGR: 17, question ID4a), to which 33% of the participants answered with 
“Romanian”, 30% with “rrom” (in two variants), 16% with “țigan” (in two variants) and 21% with other terms. For 
discussion of the data, see Matei 2012.  
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According to these results, a relevantly large number of respondents (speakers and non-speakers 
of Romani alike) use “țigan” to both identify themselves and others from their community as 
members of the same ethic group.8 
What are we to make of this data? It is obvious enough that the use of “țigan” by the 
respondents is non-derogatory.9 But, as we have seen, there are several ways of using slurs non-
derogatorily that have been discussed in the literature. A natural thought, then, is that the data 
above exemplifies one of such ways. In the reminder of this section I attempt to show that this is 
not the case and claim that the best way to make sense of the data is to postulate a sui-generis, 
irreducible type of use of slurs. The implication for the current debate is that this type of use 
must be taken into consideration when giving a complete theory of slurs. 
 
8 The researchers also asked “How offensive do you find the word “țigan”?”, and the respondents had to rate 
offensiveness on a scale from 1 (“not offensive at all”) to 5 (“very offensive”). 38.3% of those interviewed answered 
with “not offensive at all”, while 26% with “very offensive” – as can be seen in the last line of the table below 
(RGR: 27, question RD1): 
 
However, as a reviewer notes, this data cannot be used as it stands because the question doesn’t specify the source of 
the offense. The respondents could have interpreted the question asking either how offensive they find “țigan” when 
used by members of the Roma community or when used by those outside it. The significance of the data might thus 
be affected by the interpretation of the question. Further data might come from cross-linguistic studies. While the 
scarce evidence I got from personal interactions with citizens of other countries in Eastern Europe points to the 
existence of a similar use of slurs synonymous with “țigan” in languages like Serbian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Czech, 
Slovak etc., a thorough empirical study of the corresponding slurs in those languages would be of tremendous value 
for the investigation of this phenomenon. 
9 To be sure, one could take the data to suggest that the respondents identify, both themselves and others, as 
members of the Roma community, but also derogate – both themselves and the others. Grigore 2008, for example, 
takes uses of “țigan” to always carry a derogatory force even when used by members of the Roma community and 
traces it down to an internalization of the negative attitude they have been subjected to for centuries. While I don’t 
deny that such “internalized” derogatory uses exist within the Roma community, I’m skeptical that they cover the 
high percentages exhibited in the data presented above. Constantly derogating oneself and others from one’s 
community strikes me as both psychologically implausible and socially damaging. (For a different claim involving 
the n-word, though, see Alexander 2010, who takes internalized derogatory uses of the word to be part of a coping 
mechanism used by stigmatized groups, and thus socially useful.) In any case, as Grigore herself admits (p.c.), an 
identificatory element remains in such uses, which is enough to make the data interesting. 
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As already mentioned, the most widely discussed non-derogatory use of slurs is their 
appropriated use. What exactly is the mechanism of appropriation is a contentious issue, but one 
that won’t retain us here.10 What is more important in this context is the fact that there is 
variation in the way in which slurs are used even within appropriation (as witnessed, for 
example, by the discussion of the n-word in Naylor 1986 or Kennedy 2003 and of “queer” in 
Brontsema 2004). However, philosophers – while being fully aware that this is a simplification – 
have focused on two broad types of appropriated uses (e.g., Bianchi 2014; Anderson 2018; 
Jeshion 2020 calls them “pride reclamation” and “insular reclamation”, respectively). One 
pertains to social and political movements that fight for the right of certain subordinated groups, 
such as people with non-traditional genders/sexual preferences or African Americans. Within 
such practices, appropriation amounts to purposely changing the meaning of a slur in order to 
express a positive, instead of a negative, attitude towards the target group. The second sense of 
appropriation involves using a slur as a term of endearment or to express camaraderie, solidarity 
etc. Here, too, the meaning of the slur is changed so that to express a positive attitude, but not (or 
not necessarily) in connection to social and political goals. The contexts in which a slur is used in 
each of these two senses of appropriation can differ significantly, which in turn might influence 
the way in which such uses are dealt with by the theory. 
Can the data involving “țigan” above be taken to exemplify appropriated uses? This is not 
an unreasonable claim, but one that is ultimately false. First, let’s consider the sense of 
appropriation involving conscientious social and political activism. An important consideration 
in this respect, and one that I take to be decisive, is the fact that there is a strong consensus 
among activists for the rights of Roma ethnics that the way to proceed in order to block the 
negative effects of using “țigan” for the members of the Roma community is not to resemantize 
it, but to replace it with a different word: namely, the Romani word “rrom” (which is in fact 
recognized by the state as the politically correct way to address Roma ethnics).11 Thus, “țigan” is 
simply not a good example of an appropriated use of slurs in the political sense. 
 
10 It is customary to distinguish here between the process of appropriation and its result. The former involves the 
actions of those putting the meaning change in the service of social and political ideals, while the latter refers to the 
changed meaning of a slur. I am here concerned only with the second, which demands explaining the change in 
meaning by using hypotheses and theoretical tools from linguistics/philosophy. This is not to say, however, that the 
linguistic hypotheses are not affected by the form the process of reclamation takes. For more on this, see Jeshion 
2020. 
11 This, as a reviewer notes, is a good argument to take “țigan” to be a slur in the first place. 
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Consider next the use of “țigan” as expressing camaraderie or endearment. While it’s 
quite plausible that Roma ethnics sometimes use “țigan” to express camaraderie or as a term of 
endearment, I find it doubtful that this interpretation can be extended to cover all the data. For 
one, this use only involves addressing other people, while the respondents had to answer a 
question about what word they use both for others and for themselves. While one can certainly 
use the same word for both occasions, this cannot be generalized. Moreover, interpreting the data 
in this way won’t explain the use of “țigan” in responding to the questionnaire: first, the 
respondents were asked how they refer to themselves and others in their community (and not, for 
example, how the word “țigan” is used in their surroundings), which suggests that identification 
as being part of an ethnic group is an essential ingredient in this type of use; second, the context 
of the questionnaire itself doesn’t seem to be one in which considering how to express 
camaraderie or endearment would have been appropriate (among other things, because the 
researchers were most likely not Roma ethnics). This interpretation is, then, ruled out too. 
Summing up the remarks in the last two paragraphs, I conclude that interpreting the data as 
exemplifying appropriated uses, in either of the senses distinguished above, is not plausible.12 
I also don’t think that the data can be interpreted as exemplifying referential uses. As 
before, while there is no need to deny that Roma ethnics sometimes use “țigan” referentially, I 
doubt that this interpretation can be extended to cover all the data. Again, as with camaraderie 
uses of “țigan”, this use involves only addressing other people, while the question respondents 
had to answer was both about other people and about themselves. But, more importantly, as far 
as I can tell, the identificatory component is missing from Anderson’s description of referential 
uses (even if those referred to in such uses do, in fact, belong to one particular group). 
Identification, both of one’s self and of others form the community, as belonging to a specific 
ethnic group, regardless of personal relations, is precisely what is distinctive of the data I’m 
 
12 A reviewer asks whether the data cannot be interpreted as a type of appropriated use that is different from both the 
political and camaraderie sense. I suppose it can, if one so wishes, but the point I’m making is that the data doesn’t 
seem to fall easily under the two main broad forms of appropriated uses acknowledged in the literature. Moreover, 
even if it were best construed as a distinct form of appropriated use, it would still be a surprising finding. On the 
other hand, there is a trivial sense in which the data could be interpreted as exemplifying appropriated uses: namely, 
as the propensity to use a slur as a way of identifying as belonging to a group in the face of adversity, as part of the 
process of politically appropriating it. This involves a certain sense of pride (as in slogans like “we’re queer and 
we’re proud”). Although the data is silent regarding the existence of an element of pride, such an element is missing 
in the uses of “țigan” I’m focusing on (as argued by Grigore 2008). Also, this clashes with the fact that activists have 
taken the route of replacing the word with its Romani correspondent (I’m assuming here that the activists are attuned 
to the needs of the Roma community). Thanks to Dan López de Sa for bringing up the latter issue. 
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investigating (as obviously witnessed by the questionnaire). Thus, I conclude that it is not best 
interpreted as exemplifying referential uses either.13, 14 
Given the above, I think that construing the data as exemplifying either of the two types 
of appropriated use or a referential use is on the wrong track. Since an interpretation of the data 
as exemplifying NDNA, metaphorical or didactical uses seems even more far-fetched, I conclude 
that the best way to make sense of it is to postulate a sui-generis, irreducible type of use of 
“țigan”. For lack of a better word, I call this type of use “identificatory”. This is a non-derogatory 
type of use of a slur, that is similar to appropriated and referential uses in certain respects, but 
ultimately different from them (e.g., due to the fact that the identificatory aspect is essential). 
Whether other slurs, targeting either other ethnic groups or other kinds of groups, have such uses 
is an empirical question that is very much open at the moment. What is clearer, though, is that 
identificatory uses are potentially problematic for extant theories of slurs. In the next section I 
will show why, using as proxy the problems raised by appropriated uses.15 
 
3 Identificatory uses of slurs: the problem 
Many authors writing on slurs take appropriated uses to pose a problem (or at least a “puzzle” or 
a “worry”) for most extant theories of slurs.16 Given the very different commitments of the 
various theories of slurs on the market, agreement stops when it comes to the best way of 
accounting for such uses. It is not my purpose here to investigate how all extant theories of slurs 
deal with such uses; neither is it to discuss in detail how any particular theory does. Rather, the 
 
13 I’m open, though, to assimilating the two types of uses, as a reviewer suggests. If so, the theory I put forward in 
later sections will equally account for both. 
14 Other putative ways of interpreting the data are that Roma ethnics use “țigan” as captatio benevolentiae (Grigore 
2008), as a conversational shortcut or as a sign of being charitable or ironic towards the non-Roma ethnics they 
engage with. While this might be so in certain cases, I’m again doubtful that this explanation can be generalized. I 
grant, however, that more research is needed in this direction. I warmly thank Delia Grigore and Gelu Duminică, 
both Roma activists, for discussion on this point. 
15 Postulating a sui-generis, irreducible type of use of “țigan” also seems to explain the difference in the percentages 
of the “not offensive at all” answers exhibited in the first two rows of the table in footnote 8. In the first row are the 
answers of Hungarian ethnics vis-à-vis the slur “bozgor”, while in the second row are the answers of Jewish ethnics 
vis-à-vis the slur “jidan”. While for both slurs there is a non-negligible percentage of “not offensive at all” responses 
(19.6 and 22.9, respectively), the percentage of Roma ethnics that didn’t find “țigan” offensive at all is markedly 
higher (38.3%). Importantly, members of neither of the first two ethnic groups (Hungarian ethnics and Jewish 
ethnics) regularly use these words to identify themselves or others from their communities as members of a specific 
ethnic group, which suggests that such identification does play a role indeed in explaining the higher percentage 
found with Roma ethnics. However, as noted above, the data is problematic. 
16 I should make it clear that, like many authors in the debate, I’m interested in cases in which a slur can have both a 
derogatory and a appropriated use at the same time – so, in synchronic, not diachronic semantics. Thus, I’m not 
interested in cases of slurs that have been successfully appropriated (such as, according to many theorists, “queer”). 
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following general considerations serve to situate and partially motivate the view I want to 
propose. 
According to “semantic” theories (e.g., Potts 2007; Richard 2008; Hom 2008, 2010; Hom 
and May 2013; Predelli 2013; Camp 2013; Jeshion 2013), the derogatory element of slurs is 
encoded in their semantic content (i.e., their linguistic meaning). While there are significant 
differences between these theories, when considering appropriated uses many of their proponents 
have appealed to ambiguity.17 Some authors have expressed this idea in less committal terms: 
Richard, for example, writes that “there is a case to be made that in appropriation there [is] a 
meaning change” (2008, 16); Potts claims that “when lesbian and gay activists use the word 
‘queer’, its meaning (…) differs dramatically from when it is used on conservative talk radio” 
(2007, 10); according to Hom, appropriation “alters [a slur’s] meaning for use with the group” 
(2008, 428); for Whiting, in appropriation “the expressions bear a different meaning than they 
would otherwise bear” (2013, 370). Other authors have been more explicit about this 
consequence of their view: thus, Jeshion writes that 
 
It is plausible that the term acquired a new meaning via the process of appropriation. On 
this analysis, queer became semantically ambiguous upon appropriation. Initially, it was 
non-ambiguous, its only linguistic standing as a slur, one whose derogating capacity can 
be accounted for semantically. Later, it came to have another conventional use, one that 
is non-pejorative. (Jeshion 2013, 250). 
 
Appeal to ambiguity, however, is not a satisfactory solution in relation to appropriated 
uses. While some slurs seem to pass the usual tests for ambiguity (e.g., Sennet 2016)18, other 
considerations militate against the idea. For example, taking slurs to be ambiguous leaves an 
important part of the process of appropriation out. As Rappaport writes, “[i]t is important to 
recognize that the power of appropriation comes in part from the fact that it is the same word that 
is being appropriated (2019, 17), while Tirrell nicely expresses the same idea when she says that 
 
17 As the following quotes illustrate, the authors involved don’t clearly distinguish between ambiguity in the sense of 
homonymy and in the sense of polysemy. While in both cases there are several meanings attached to a word (or at 
least to a unique string of symbols), in the former those meanings are disconnected, while in the latter they are 
interrelated. (Compare “bank” – financial institution/river area with “bottle” – container/content, for example.) I 
interpret the authors mentioned below as proposing that slurs are homonymous, while according to the view I offer 
slurs are polysemous. 
18 However, given that the accuracy of those tests has been widely disputed, not much weight should be put on this. 
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an appropriated slur “is the same word, with the same history, but with a new future” (1999, 60). 
Related, and perhaps more importantly, ambiguity doesn’t work in the context of appropriation 
(in the political sense) because it simply defeats its purpose. Arguably, while at the beginning of 
the process the aim of appropriating a slur is to make the members of the target group use it with 
a positive meaning, ultimately the aim is to make everyone use it with that meaning – that is, to 
eradicate one of the meanings altogether. But this aim couldn’t be achieved if the slur is 
construed as ambiguous. For what would be the basis on which to claim that one meaning of the 
term is mistaken and urge everyone to replace it with another meaning? In the case of “bank” or 
other clearly ambiguous terms, the reaction to one’s apparently improper use of the term with a 
certain meaning can at most be a requirement to clarify that meaning, and not to eradicate it. The 
same should be true if appropriated slurs are taken to be similar to “bank”. Yet, things are 
different in the case of appropriated slurs: what a target group aims at by slur-appropriation is 
precisely replacing one meaning with another. 
Importantly, I don’t think that what is known as “the reclamation worry”, originating in 
remarks by Anderson and Lepore 2013a and further discussed by quite a few authors (Ritchie 
2017; Cepollaro 2017; Anderson 2018; Burnett 2020; Jeshion 2020) is a real problem for 
semantic views that appeal to ambiguity. In a nutshell, the problem Anderson and Lepore see is 
that mere postulation of ambiguity leaves a host of questions unanswered, such as who is 
allowed to use a slur in an appropriated manner, who is excluded from doing so, and why is that 
so. While these are no doubt important questions, it is not clear that they need to fall under the 
purview of semantics – an explanation in extra-linguistic terms based, for example, on social, 
moral and political considerations would work just fine. Additionally, several answers have been 
given to the worry, some of them from the standpoint of a semantic theory.19 So, while I take 
ambiguity to be problematic, I do so for different reasons that those invoked by the reclamation 
worry. 
 
19 Thus, Cepollaro 2017 argues that a simple explanation involving speakers’ intentions and context is available to 
proponents of the semantic view. Both Cepollaro 2017 and Jeshion 2020 argue that the worry doesn’t arise with 
other cases (e.g., honorifics) in which restrictions on the use of ambiguous words are present. Burnett 2020 claims 
that a derogatory attitude is or is not inferred (thus, not part of the linguistic meaning) based on the ideologies one 
subscribes to. A response amounting to a purely semantic proposal is Ritchie 2017, who takes slurs to be ambiguous 
between a derogatory and a non-derogatory meaning, the latter having an indexical element built in (basically, a 
“we” that assures that the speaker is part of the right group). Ingenuous as it is, I find Ritchie’s view ad-hoc. See also 
Cepollaro 2017 and Jeshion 2020 for further, and more substantial, criticism. 
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Appropriated uses create problems not only for semantic accounts but for others as well – 
for example, for “pragmatic” approaches to slurs: accounts that take the derogatory element of 
slurs to be contributed by various pragmatic mechanisms associated with a (use of a) slur. While 
they might have an easier time than semantic views, there is considerable footwork to be done in 
order to account for appropriated uses. Views like Williamson’s 2009 or Whiting’s 2013, for 
example, that take the derogatory content of a slur to be contributed via an implicature to the 
effect that the target group is worthy of derogation need to provide an explanation of why the 
relevant implicature is not generated in appropriated uses. Further, views like Cepollaro’s 2015, 
Cepollaro and Stojanovic’s 2016, Marques and García-Carpintero’s 2020 that take the 
derogatory content of a slur to be contributed via a presupposition to the same effect need to 
explain how come such uses are felicitous without the relevant presupposition being in place. 
Other views that don’t fall squarely within the semantic/pragmatic distinction are not without 
problems either: thus, the echoic view proposed by Bianchi 2014, while devised precisely with 
the aim of accounting for appropriated uses, has been criticized for giving a merely partial 
explanation of the phenomenon (by, e.g., Jeshion 2020), while Anderson and Lepore’s 2013a, 
2013b prohibitionist view seems to provide a good account of the uses at stake, but it has been 
rejected by the majority of the authors involved in this debate for independent reasons. 
Accounting for appropriated uses thus seems to be at least prima facie problematic for 
many of the views on the market. Now, the authors involved in the debate over the right account 
of slurs have not considered identificatory uses, but it is fair to say that the same solutions they 
offer for appropriated uses would probably be applied to these too. For example, it seems natural 
for proponents of semantic views to appeal to ambiguity, as in the case of appropriated uses; and 
although this is speculative, it is not unreasonable, given that identificatory uses pose a very 
similar problem to that posed by appropriated ones. The same considerations apply to pragmatic 
and the other types of views mentioned earlier: accounting for identificatory uses is not trivial 
and requires significant work. I thus conclude that it is very likely that most views currently on 
the market have troubles with accounting for the whole range of data, including identificatory 
uses. This, I believe, mandates the search for a better theory. 
Before going on to sketch the view I prefer, let me first situate it. At one extreme we have 
ambiguity. We have seen that many of the extant views on the market (especially semantic 
views) would appeal to it in accounting for identificatory uses. We have also seen several 
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reasons for which postulating ambiguity doesn’t amount to a very satisfactory solution in the 
case of appropriated uses. Since we aim for a theory that accounts for the whole range of the 
data, this won’t do. At the other extreme, one could embrace a radical contextualist view20, 
according to which whether a certain word carries derogatory force depends mostly on the 
intentions, beliefs and attitudes of the speaker instead of being encoded in language. While such 
a view would perhaps make the right predictions in the case of identificatory uses, I take it to be 
untenable in general for slurs because it runs afoul of one of their most well-established traits: 
independence (in the sense employed in section 1). My aim in the reminder of the paper is to 
present a view that steers between the two extremes mentioned and has the means to account for 
all the uses of slurs focused on here. The view is that slurs are polysemous. 
 
4 A rich-lexicon theory of nouns 
Polysemy has been studied preponderantly in lexical semantics, where two broad types of 
theories dealing with the phenomenon are the main contenders: rich-lexicon theories and thin-
lexicon theories.21 According to the former, words have as their linguistic meaning rich 
conceptual structures comprised of interrelated dimensions of meaning which get selected in a 
particular context; according to the latter, the linguistic meaning of words is very thin (at 
minimum, just a string of symbols), with more robust meanings being constructed with the help 
of contextual clues and encyclopedic knowledge. A rich-lexicon theory of linguistic meaning fits 
better my purposes in this paper, so I will adopt that framework without entering the debate of 
which of the two is better. Now, there are numerous such rich-lexicon theories on the market. 
Which particular theory to adopt in accounting for polysemy is, to a certain extent, indifferent to 
my purposes here. I will, however, flesh out the view I favor by using a theory based on qualia 
and qualia-structures (e.g., Pustejovsky 1995): units of meaning that encapsulate certain types of 
information and which are interrelated in certain ways. While appeal to qualia-structures has 
been criticized as being insufficient to account for all the variability data (see Hogeweg and 
 
20 For example, the view known as “truth-conditional pragmatics”, defended, among others, by Recanati 2004 
(although, for Recanati, speaker intentions are not the only contextual factor determining meaning, his attitude being 
quite lax in this respect). In relation to slurs, Kennedy 2003 is taken to hold such a radical view. 
21 Prominent examples of works in lexical semantics (although not with application to slurs) are Jackendoff 1990; 
Pustejovsky 1995; Asher 2011. For a review article of how polysemy is treated in lexical semantics, see Falkum and 
Vicente 2015, and Hogeweg and Vicente 2020 for a detailed discussion of arguments in favor of each type of theory. 
For a nuanced view that is pluralistic (that is, accepts both rich- and thin-lexicon theories as applying to different 
types of words), see Vicente 2018. 
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Vicente 2020 for an overview), such a framework remains widely used in lexical semantics and 
will fit the purpose of this paper. 
To illustrate, then, I will use the rich-lexicon framework developed by Del Pinal 2018. 
While the framework was designed to substantiate a truth-conditional pragmatic view, it can be 
easily used to show how a rich-lexicon theory can deal with polysemy. Del Pinal’s main idea is 
that the meaning of words can be represented by a tuple consisting in an extension (“E-
structure”) and a conceptual structure (“C-structure”). The conceptual structure comprises the 
various quale associated with a word. In the case of nouns, the structure is taken to comprise at 
least perceptual information about the objects referred to with the noun (call that dimension 
PERCEPTUAL), information about what those objects are made of or their parts 
(CONSTITUTIVE), how they came to being or the purpose of their creation (AGENTIVE), their 
typical function (TELIC). To put a bit more flesh on the bones, let me give an example. Take the 
noun “book”. Applying the abstract framework laid out above, the lexical entry for “book” under 
the rich-lexicon theory considered is something along the following lines: 
 
PERCEPTUAL: shape, size, color etc. 
CONSTITUTIVE: cover, pages, etc. 
AGENTIVE: printed, written etc. 
TELIC: to entertain, to learn from etc. 
 
The precise components of the conceptual structure will of course differ across types of words: 
while the one above is customary for nouns, the one usually associated with a verb, for example, 
might comprise completely different meaning dimensions. While it is no doubt important for a 
lexical semantic theory to mark these differences and draw a complete map of the meaning 
dimensions postulated, this is not my aim here. The example of “book” will be enough for my 
purposes. 
Now, while the full linguistic meaning of a word comprises the conceptual structure with 
all its dimensions, in a particular use of a word in a given context certain dimensions are 
highlighted in the detriment of others. This, in essence, is a mechanism of selection. Although 
clearly important, I won’t commit here to any particular way of conceiving this mechanism. As 
with choosing a particular rich-lexicon theory, the main purpose of this paper can be achieved if 
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I remain neutral on this score, too. The mechanisms appealed to by Pustejovsky 1995, Asher 
2011, Del Pinal 2018 or those described in Frisson 2009 or Schumacher 2013 are all plausible 
candidates – although, of course, which of them is the most adequate, both generally and for the 
task at hand, is something that remains to be established.22 
Thus, instead of choosing one of the various mechanisms found in the literature, I 
propose to use placeholders. I will use the generic term “foregrounding” to designate the process 
by which a certain meaning dimension is selected or highlighted in a certain context, and the 
generic term “backgrounding” to designate the process by which a certain meaning dimension is 
taken out of the spotlight. To come back to our example, in a sentence like “This book is bound 
in leather”, the CONSTITUTIVE dimension of the lexical meaning of “book” is foregrounded 
and the other dimensions are backgrounded: what is important in this context is what the book, in 
the physical sense, is made of. In contrast, in a sentence like “This book is interesting”, the 
AGENTIVE dimension is foregrounded while the other dimensions are backgrounded: what is 
important in this context is the content of the book and how it affects the reader. Notably, 
foregrounding and backgrounding take place even in the absence of linguistic clues from the 
context (a role played by the predicates “bound in leather” and “interesting” in the sentences 
above): a sentence like “This book is great” could mean that the physical copy of the book is 
great, but also that it is great content-wise.23 These mechanisms explain how words can get 
different meanings in different contexts, while preserving their full linguistic meaning. 
Importantly, this avoids postulating ambiguity: we are not talking here about two different words 
that happen to consist of the same strings of symbols, but about one word, characterized by a rich 
structure of interrelated meanings out of which a particular one (or, in some cases, several) is 
selected in a given context. 
 
 
 
22 What I take these various mechanisms to have in common is that they are cognitive in nature, and are activated in 
the course of the compositional process that yields meaning to complex sentences from the meanings of their parts 
in context. The selection of meaning dimensions happens at the lexical level (thus, before the meaning of the word 
enters into the compositional process) and so is not a case of “pragmatic intrusion”, or a “secondary pragmatic 
process” of the type appealed to by Recanati 2004, for example. I will not address the issue of how composition 
works in the framework proposed – although I agree it is a crucial issue – but see Del Pinal 2018 for details. 
23 “Great” is, most likely, polysemous too. 
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5 Applying the theory to slurs24 
The first step in applying this rich-lexicon theory to “țigan” in particular and to slurs in general 
consists in the introduction in the conceptual structure associated with the relevant words of an 
evaluative dimension (EVALUATIVE) responsible for the slurs’ derogatory force.25 What 
exactly should be packed into this meaning dimension is a contentious issue. Arguably, it cannot 
contain merely a subjective-expressive component – that would not properly differentiate slurs 
from other types of expressions (e.g., expressives like “jerk” or “asshole”). I take the 
EVALUATIVE dimension to contain elements of a more social nature, such as stereotypes 
(Williamson 2009), perspectives (Camp 2013) or ideologies (Burnett 2020) that ground the 
negative evaluation of the target group by users of a slurs. The stereotype associated with “țigan” 
for example, is something like “lazy, thief, unwilling to respect social norms etc.”, which 
encapsulates the perspective of a racist ideology propagated by the bigoted majority. While this 
is merely an approximation, I take it to be enough to give an idea of what the EVALUATIVE 
dimension could consists in.  
The second step is determining what the other meaning dimensions in the case of slurs 
are. While there are considerable differences between “book” and “țigan”, they are both nouns, 
and so we can use (at least as a starting point) some of the meaning dimensions listed in the 
lexical entry provided above for “book”. Not all meaning dimensions that are present in the 
lexical entry of “book” are needed in the case of “țigan”: for example, since the latter picks up a 
social group, postulating a TELIC dimension is not warranted (what would be the purpose of a 
social group?). Also, since “țigan” refers to people belonging to an ethnic group, with a certain 
provenance, history and social standing, the introduction of a meaning dimension that 
 
24 Other explicit polysemy accounts of slurs are rare: see Ritchie 2017 and Jeshion 2020. However, Ritchie is 
ambivalent between an ambiguity and a polysemy account, while Jeshion prefers a thin-lexicon theory (p.c.). I 
briefly engage with two more developed rich-lexicon theories in footnote 28 below. 
25 Del Pinal and Reuter 2016 postulate a normative dimension in the lexical entry of expressions like “father”, 
“scientist” or “woman”. This idea pertains to an independent research programme taking various types of 
expressions in natural language to encode “dual character concepts”, whose main trait is that they have both a 
referential aspect (they refer to a class of objects) and a normative one (they encapsulate certain normative 
properties that makes the objects within that class to be what they are). See, for example, Knobe, Prasada and 
Newman 2013; Leslie 2015; Del Pinal and Reuter 2015 for applications of this idea to various types of expressions, 
and Reuter 2019 for an overview. This duality resembles that of slurs, which suggests a possible treatment of the 
latter along these lines. In principle, I am open to the idea of treating slurs as encoding dual character concepts. 
Whether this ultimately works requires inquiring into the relation between the evaluative dimensions slurs encode 
and the normative one postulated in the dual character concepts framework. I will leave this inquiry for another 
occasion, but for a recent proposal in that direction (although of a different kind than the one pursued here), see 
Marques and García-Carpintero 2020. 
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encapsulates this aspect (call it ORIGIN) is desirable.26 The other meaning dimensions from the 
lexical entry of “book” can be kept. Thus, I propose to conceive of the lexical entry for “țigan”, 
under the rich-lexicon theory considered, as something along the following lines: 
  
EVALUATIVE: negative evaluation based on stereotypes, ideologies etc. 
PERCEPTUAL: shape, size, color etc. 
CONSTITUTIVE: body parts etc. 
AGENTIVE: born etc. 
ORIGIN: provenance, history, social standing etc. 
 
There is surely room for further amendments and additions in light of future findings in cognitive 
science, linguistics and the theory of concepts, but I take this entry to serve as a sufficiently clear 
example of how the rich-lexicon theory sketched in the previous section can be applied to slurs. 
When it comes to accounting for the various uses tackled in this paper, the same 
mechanisms appealed to in the case of “book” and exemplified in section 4 will be used here too. 
In other words, the meaning dimension that is relevant for a use of a slur in a specific context is 
selected via foregrounding and backgrounding. Let’s start with derogatory uses. When someone 
uses “țigan” in this way, the EVALUATIVE dimension is foregrounded, while the other 
meaning dimensions are backgrounded. This can be graphically represented as follows (with the 
“c” signifying that the word is used in a context and the bolded material signifying the meaning 
dimension that is selected in c):  
 
EVALUATIVE: negative evaluation based on stereotypes, ideology etc.   c 
PERCEPTUAL: shape, size, color etc. 
CONSTITUTIVE: body parts etc. 
AGENTIVE: born etc. 
ORIGIN: provenance, history, social standing etc. 
 
 
26 Thanks to Max Kölbel for suggesting this label. 
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On the other hand, when someone uses “țigan” in an identificatory way, the 
EVALUATIVE dimension is backgrounded, while other meaning dimensions – ORIGIN, for 
example – are foregrounded. Again, this can be represented as follows: 
 
EVALUATIVE: negative evaluation based on stereotypes, ideology etc.    c 
PERCEPTUAL: shape, size, color etc. 
CONSTITUTIVE: body parts etc. 
AGENTIVE: born etc. 
ORIGIN: provenance, history, social standing etc. 
 
The difference between using “țigan” in a derogatory way and using it in an identificatory 
way thus consists in different meaning dimensions being highlighted in the two contexts, and 
thus selected as the meaning of the word in each context. Importantly, as with “book”, this 
avoids postulating ambiguity: we are not talking here about two different words that happen to 
consist in the same strings of symbols, but about one word, characterized by a rich structure of 
interrelated meanings out of which a particular one (or, in some cases, several) is selected in a 
given context. What goes for “țigan” goes, mutatis mutandis, for other slurs used in an 
identificatory way. 
What about appropriated uses? In section 2, I have argued that the data involving the use 
of “țigan” by Roma ethnics in Romania pertains to a sui-generis, irreducible type of use, and that 
that use is different from appropriated uses. But can the rich-lexicon theory sketched above be 
applied to appropriated uses as well? A positive answer to this question will lead to an important 
gain in terms of economy and theoretical unity. 
Indeed, the theory can be minimally modified to account for appropriated uses too. The 
point where the modification has to be made concerns the EVALUATIVE dimension. As it 
stands now, EVALUATIVE captures the speakers’ negative evaluation of members of the target 
group; but, given that in appropriation a positive evaluation is communicated instead, what has to 
be done is to allow it to become part of the EVALUATIVE dimension. To do this, I appeal to the 
notion of “valence” (the type of evaluation, positive or negative, of an object): instead of directly 
encoding a negative evaluation in EVALUATIVE, we allow for the evaluation to have a certain 
valence, whose value will be determined in context. Thus, when someone uses a slur in a 
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derogatory way, not only is the EVALUATIVE dimension foregrounded, but the value of the 
valence is a negative evaluation by the speaker of members of the target group. When someone 
uses a slur in an appropriated way, the EVALUATIVE dimension is also foregrounded (and not 
backgrounded as in the case of identificatory uses), but with the valence inversed, its value being 
now a positive evaluation by the speaker of members of the target group. To illustrate27, an 
appropriated use of “țigan” in a context will thus be represented as follows:  
 
EVALUATIVE: valence (c) = positive evaluation (…)   c 
PERCEPTUAL: shape, size, color etc. 
CONSTITUTIVE: body parts etc. 
AGENTIVE: born etc. 
ORIGIN: provenance, history, social standing etc.  
 
Thus, all three types of uses of slurs focused on in this paper can be accounted for in the rich-
lexicon theory proposed. To repeat, understanding slurs as polysemous and allowing different 
meaning dimensions to be selected in different contexts via foregrounding and backgrounding 
avoids the postulation of ambiguity, preserving a unique linguistic meaning for slurs (consisting 
in a rich structure of interrelated meanings), despite the many uses they can be put to. This is one 
of the advantages that a polysemy account has over merely postulating ambiguity: it is the same 
word, with the same linguistic meaning, that is up both for appropriation and identification.28 
 
27 As mentioned before, members of the Roma community are not keen on appropriating “țigan”; however, I’m 
using this example to keep with the previous discussion and to better highlight the differences between appropriated 
and identificatory uses.  
28 Many of the semantic views on the market claim that the meaning of slurs is rich, at least in the sense that they 
comprise a descriptive component and an expressive/evaluative one. Some authors add further “levels” of 
information that play a role in their account of slurs (e.g., Jeshion 2013). The view I propose is not essentially 
different from those, except perhaps by making the meaning dimensions more explicit and more structured. 
However, several views have postulated lexical entries for slurs that are more fine-grained, and thus closer to the 
view sketched above. I briefly present two such views. 
According to Croom 2011, 2013, slurs encode rich conceptual structures that have as their meaning 
dimensions properties, both positive and negative, that the prototypical members of the target groups are taken to 
possess. Croom holds a family resemblance conception of category membership, according to which there is no 
essential property that all members of the target group need to share for the slur to apply, but that different members 
share some of the properties associated with them. The properties are ranked; this ranking, however, is context-
sensitive and helps in communicating with slurs: a speaker selects among the properties in question those which are 
suitable for a given communicative situation. When a slur is used derogatorily, for example, the negative properties 
prototypical members of the target group are taken to have are selected, while when used appropriately, the positive 
ones are (or the negative ones are evaluated positively). 
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6 Further issues 
Before closing, I want to briefly address three issues that, prima facie at least, arise for the view 
put forward. The first concerns the role of speaker intentions in determining the semantic content 
of slurs. As stressed, I take it to be crucial that a theory of slurs respects independence – the fact 
that the derogatoriness of slurs doesn’t depend solely on the intentions, attitudes and beliefs of 
speakers. But, on the other hand, it seems that the speakers’ intentions do matter in the 
framework adopted – namely, in deciding what meaning dimensions from the lexical entry of a 
slur are foregrounded and which are backgrounded in a certain context. This leads to a tension. 
I certainly agree that intentions play a role in the way in which meaning dimensions are 
selected from the rich lexical entries that slurs encode. But I claim that this role is highly 
constrained. The constraints that I think are at work here are of a social, moral and political 
nature. In other words, what meaning dimensions are selected in a certain context is a matter of 
the speaker going through the corresponding cognitive process, but whether the selection of a 
particular meaning dimension is legitimate in that context is a matter pertaining to social, moral 
and political considerations. In this way, the selection of a meaning dimension is something that 
goes beyond the intentions, attitudes and beliefs of the speaker. To be sure, there is an 
interconnection between these, but the latter don’t, in themselves, determine the former. This 
way of understanding the constraints in play accounts for the intuition that, for example, the 
(derogatory) use of a slur by a member of a dominant group to derogate a member of a 
subordinated group is illegitimate, as well as for the intuition that the (appropriated) use of a slur 
by a member of a subordinated group to fight injustice, or to express camaraderie or endearment 
towards another member of the same group is legitimate. Similarly for the intuition that members 
of certain ethnic groups (like Roma ethnics) can legitimately identify using a word that is a slur 
(like “tigan”). Looking from the other end, this doesn’t mean that the role many authors (e.g., 
Anderson 2018; Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2018; Hess 2020) think social, moral and political 
 
Neufeld 2019 proposes a richly structured “essentialist” theory of slurs, according to which they are “failed 
kind terms” – that is, with null extension. The novelty of the view is the claim that part of the meaning dimensions 
of a slur is an “essence” that is given a causal-explanatory role for the negative traits that members of the target 
group are perceived to have. That is, what explains and causes the members of the target group to have the negative 
traits perceived is precisely this “essence” (“blackness”, “queerness” etc.); but since no such real essences exist, the 
terms fail to refer. Neufeld offers a view that features several meaning dimensions (negative stereotypes, essence, 
causality) but, in addition to Croom, she takes these to be causally organized in the way described.  
A detailed comparison between these three members of the rich-lexicon family, as well as an assessment of 
which handles the data presented in this paper better, would no doubt be of interest, but due to reasons of space it 
will have to be left for another occasion. 
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considerations play in a slur’s life is downplayed: just because they are given a constraining, 
rather than a fully semantic, role doesn’t mean they are not important.29 While such moral, 
social, and political considerations introduce a certain degree of relativity into the picture (which 
is more or less to be expected), independence is saved.30 
The second issue I want to address concerns the equivalence between the truth-conditions 
of sentences containing slurs vs. sentences containing their neutral counterparts. Their presumed 
equivalence has been used as an argument against many extant theories of slurs – more recently 
by Neufeld 2019, but also by Croom 2015. One of the main reasons this equivalence has been 
taken to be problematic is that it blocks an account of what is known as “G-extending” uses of 
slurs: basically, the use of a slur in order to derogate someone who is not part of the target group. 
Since such uses are widespread, not accounting for them in a suitable manner limits a theory’s 
power.  
Does this criticism apply to the view put forward here? It doesn’t, and the reason is 
simple: that the lexical entries that the view assigns to slurs and to their neutral counterparts are 
different. As we have seen, in the case of “tigan” the EVALUATIVE dimension is always 
present: foregrounded in derogatory/appropriated uses, backgrounded in identificatory uses. 
However, no such dimensions appears in the lexical entry of “rrom” (the politically correct term 
used by Roma activists which we can take here to serve as the slurs’ neutral counterpart); in fact, 
the latter has all the meaning dimensions “tigan” has, except EVALAUTIVE. Since the lexical 
entries of the two words are different, the truth-conditions of the sentences they appear in are not 
equivalent.31 As for G-extending uses, the view yields those as well: when, for example, “tigan” 
 
29 Although, as we have seen in discussing the EVALUATIVE dimension in section 5, they permeate the semantics 
proper as well, via stereotypes, perspectives or ideologies, which are essentially social/moral/political phenomena. 
30 Two reviewers ask whether ambiguity views cannot help themselves with the same move. I can’t see why not – 
once they answer the worries about ambiguity spelled out in section 3 above, that is. What is important to keep in 
mind is that, under the polysemy view that I offer, the derogatory character of slurs is always part of their lexical 
meaning, regardless of the way it is used in a certain context, while this is not so in ambiguity approaches. In any 
case, even if this is not taken to be an advantage, a polysemy account is interestingly different from an ambiguity 
one and independently worthy of investigation (see also my brief remark at the end of section 1). 
31 I haven’t provided any precise description of how various meaning dimensions affect truth-conditions, but the 
short (and trivial) answer is: by giving a specific meaning of a certain word, which then enters into the 
compositional computation of the entire sentence. For example, ORIGIN specifies a meaning that applies to people 
having the corresponding provenance, PERCEPTUAL a meaning that applies to people having the corresponding 
shape, size, color, etc. EVALUATIVE specifies a meaning that applies to people that meet the stereotype the 
speaker associates with members of the target group. Obviously, a more detailed account is needed. For one that 
might be used in the present case, see del Pinal 2018. 
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is used in that way, the ORIGIN dimension is backgrounded, thus freeing the slur for application 
to people that are not members of the Roma community. 
The third issue tackled, also used as an argument against many current theories of slurs 
by Neufeld 2019, but also by Hom and May 2013, is whether the sentences containing slurs are, 
strictly speaking, true. This would be problematic especially when slurs are used derogatorily 
because it presupposes that there is something in the world that has all the negative traits that 
members of the target groups are perceived to have. In the case of the two works cited, the 
problem doesn’t arise because the extension of the slurs is empty. I am not sure what the best 
response to this worry is, but what I want to point out is that the tables can be turned: an 
important question for views that postulate null extensions for slurs is how to account for 
appropriated uses in particular and for non-derogatory uses in general. This seems to be 
notoriously difficult for views like these, because sentences containing slurs that are used in an 
appropriated manner are intuitively true. Hom’s preferred solution is appeal to ambiguity, while 
Neufeld doesn’t address appropriation at all. While I concede that an answer to the worry should 
be given, the issue of which of the opposed families of views fares better is far from settled. 
 
7 Summary and conclusions 
This paper had two aims. The first was to bring to light certain data about the use of the 
Romanian slur “țigan” by Roma ethnics from Romania. The data, gathered from a Romanian 
Government report from 2009, shows that a relevantly large number of Roma ethnics use the 
word to identify both as individuals and as a group (hence, the name “identificatory” for this type 
of use). Further, I argued that this data cannot be subsumed under types of uses of slurs 
previously discussed in the literature (in particular, appropriated and referential uses) and that a 
better option is to claim that they point to a sui-generis, irreducible type of use of slurs. The 
extent, underlying conditions, and further characteristics of this use are still to be inquired into, 
and one would expect cross-linguistic studies to be of help here. 
Identificatory uses of slurs show that there is even more variation in the use of slurs than 
previously acknowledged. The second aim of the paper was to provide an account that explains 
this variation. The main idea behind the account I sketched is that slurs are polysemous. While 
this has been claimed more or less explicitly by various authors in the literature, there are 
relatively few detailed accounts to be found. I have chosen to implement this idea by appealing 
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to a rich-lexicon framework borrowed from lexical semantics, according to which the lexical 
entries of nouns are comprised of several meaning dimensions, among which the specific 
meaning of a noun in a context is selected. While I remained neutral about the exact mechanism 
by which this selection is achieved (using the placeholders “foregrounding” and 
“backgrounding”), I have shown how the framework can be applied to “țigan” and its uses, and 
to slurs in general. Finally, I have briefly discussed three pressing issues. While many details 
remain to be ironed out, and various questions to be addressed, the paper brings both new data to 
the fore and polysemy views of slurs into sharper focus. 
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